Remarks for Panel Discussion on
"Multilateral Disarmament/Future of the NPT After the Iraq War"
Bipartisan Task Force on Non-Proliferation
June 18, 2003
Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

In the post-Iraq period, we face a difficult environment: the established UN system and its accompanying regimes such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty are being seriously shaken. We have much work to do to ensure that these institutions retain their authority and influence in international affairs.

I believe that we must take a broad-spectrum view of how to achieve this goal The Carnegie Endowment was the originator of the "muscular inspection" or "coercive inspection" idea prior to the Iraq war[1], but I would like to stress that we should not only look to that end of the spectrum where military force resides. We also need to look at the end of the spectrum where more positive inducements or incentives reside. I would like to use this presentation to offer up a number of ideas along a broad spectrum, focused on strengthening enforcement and implementation of the non-proliferation regime. If adopted, these ideas could strengthen significantly future efforts at multilateral disarmament.

First, let us consider the more military-oriented end of the spectrum. The idea of muscular inspections, combining inspections with military force, or deploying military forces with inspectors, came in for much criticism prior to the Iraq war, including from inspectors, who saw the concept as imposing additional unwanted burdens on the inspection process. Nevertheless, it also seems clear that Saddam Hussein finally began to offer up more cooperation when the military buildup began to accelerate in January and February of this year. Indeed, Iraq's best cooperation historically, with UNSCOM, was when military forces from the 1991 coalition were still close at hand. Given this reality, we should continue to examine options for coercive or muscular inspections—not as a routine matter, but for the special, most difficult cases. We should welcome the recognition of this necessity that has come from the European Union. In June 2003, the EU Foreign Minister agreed to a strategy that foresees the use of 'coercive measures,' under the aegis of the United Nations, as a last resort in preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Second, in the middle of the spectrum, we should consider options that are developments of existing multilateral policy. For example, we may want to consider an initiative to make the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement mandatory for all parties to the NPT. We might also consider new strengthened safeguards. In addition, for the long term, we might consider establishing additional international norms, such as making trafficking in nuclear weapon materials and components illegal, just as drug trafficking and slave trading is illegal.

[1] See "Iraq: A New Approach," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2002. Available at www.ceip.org/pubs.

This is an idea with a certain currency in the Bush Administration. At the G-8 Summit in Evian in June 2003, President Bush launched a "Proliferation Security Initiative," the aim of which is to develop and implement this concept. The Administration followed up shortly thereafter with meetings in Madrid to discuss the details. I would like to note that in the past, a ban on slave trading was followed in time by the abolition of slavery. Thus, it seems to me that we are establishing the right evolutionary path with such an "anti-trafficking" initiative in the nuclear arena.

Finally, at the end of the spectrum devoted to incentives or inducements, I would like to discuss threat reduction cooperation as a new option for multilateral disarmament. In the summer of 2002, at Kananaskis, Canada, the Group of Eight (G-8) Industrialized Countries established the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. While the initial emphasis of this initiative has been on work in the Russian Federation, it has done an enormous amount to raise international awareness of the need to protect and eliminate potentially vulnerable weapons of mass destruction assets around the world.

Consonant with these efforts, I have spent much of the past year examining how the experience of U.S.-Russian threat reduction and nonproliferation cooperation might be extended to other regions of the world. [This work resulted in a Carnegie Endowment study, "Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-terrorism Struggle,"[2] which I have briefed in whole or in part in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, with other G-8 partners and in South Asia.] In my view, there is a significant amount of international interest in how we might mine our ten-year experience in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union to inform and structure nonproliferation cooperation in other parts of the world. Indeed, in future the G-8 initiative has the potential to reach beyond Russia and become "internationalized."

In this troubled period for multilateral disarmament efforts, I would like to draw your attention to a hopeful possibility: might it not be possible to use the experience that we have gained in the past ten years of U.S.-Russian cooperation to fashion new methods for the nonproliferation regime? In future, might it not be possible to give special credit to countries that facilitate nonproliferation cooperation inside their nuclear facilities? For example, if a country is cooperating with an international team to enhance protection of nuclear fuel at its power plants, and that team has regular access to those facilities, might we not consider those facilities to be in good standing in the nonproliferation regime?

Naturally, this standing would only remain in place for as long as the cooperation remained intact, as a stepping-stone to full participation (or resumption of participation) in the nonproliferation regime. Indeed, allow me to stress this aspect: the approach I am

[2] Rose Gottemoeller with Rebecca Longsworth, "Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-Terrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation," Working Paper No. 29, August 2002, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Global Policy Program, Non-Proliferation Project. The author gratefully acknowledges that this work was funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

suggesting could never replace full participation in the nonproliferation regime, but would only serve as a stepping-stone towards it.

To illustrate the approach, I am going to suggest what will seem an extremely unlikely and controversial example, North Korea. Unfortunately, due to the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program, we have seen that country actively seeking to withdraw from the NPT regime. At the moment, the outlook seems grim, but let us suppose that we *are* able to engage North Korea in a diplomatic process to try to resolve the issues and bring that country eventually into the international community, really for the first time. North Korea would receive political and economic cooperation and assurances of its security. For its part, North Korea would agree to shut down and eliminate its nuclear facilities. To achieve that goal, we might engage an international team, e.g. through the G-8 Global Partnership, to carry out cooperative threat reduction projects. Eventually, if North Korea cooperated well with these projects, it might be considered to be on the road to good standing again in the nonproliferation regime: a stepping-stone to resuming full membership in the NPT. Again, this may seem an unlikely example, but it is an idea worth considering. In general, we should explore how the joint threat reduction experience with Russia and the other states of the Former Soviet Union might bring new opportunities and tools to the realm of multilateral disarmament diplomacy.

In sum, in pursuing multilateral disarmament after the Iraq war, we should not emphasize one tool of policy—military force—over others such as cooperative inducements or incentives. We should concentrate on achieving a broad-spectrum approach that maximizes our opportunities for success.